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Justice, Due Process and the Rule of Law in
Nigeria: the Story of Constable Thomas
Shorunke, 1940–1946
Kemi Rotimi – Adetunji Ojo Ogunyemiy
In 1940, Nigeria was just one of the four British West African dependencies. Her legal
system was still at its infancy and its criminal justice system had just begun to unfold
under the watchful but dominant eyes of imperial Britain. Still, in that year, up to 1946,
an event of great import to the universally acclaimed doctrine of rule of law happened
in the case of a police constable, Thomas Shorunke, who, in the face of daunting chal-
lenges and awesomeness of His Majesty, George VI’s (1936–1952) prosecutorial powers,
clung to the doctrine to secure justice for himself and to chart a significant path for one
of Nigeria’ most profound cases involving questions of the due process of law and sub-
stantial justice. In this paper, we show not just the history of the contest between a police
officer and the King but, in addition, discuss an aspect of the history of judge-made laws
under Nigeria’s criminal justice system and by so doing, document a major exercise in
courage and tenacity demonstrated by a junior police officer under colonial rule.
[rule of law; due process; Nigeria Police; justice; Privy Council; Supreme Court Ordi-
nance]
Introduction
By 1940, Nigeria was no longer a stranger to the British Legal system.
She had been carved into a British Protectorate in the second half of the
19th century after a series of developmentwhich beganwith the annex-
ation of Lagos in 1861 and climaxed in the total overrun of the whole
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of the country by British forces in 1903.1 The country was however
subdued differently as two separate Protectorates of the North and
the South and a Colony in Lagos.2 In 1914 however, both the North-
ern and Southern Protectorates and the Colony of Lagos were amalga-
mated and consolidated into one State under British hegemony with
the British legal system imposed thereupon subject to minor exemp-
tions in the areas of private customary law.3
Hence, by 1940, when the case of stealing and breaking which are
the issues of this study came up at Ibadan, the English legal system
especially those governing criminal matters were already 77 years old
in Nigeria having been introduced and legitimised first in Lagos in
1863 under the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1863 and subsequently
consolidated in the Protectorate Court Ordinance of 1933.4 In fact, by
the start of World War I, a very crucial legislation called the Supreme
Court Ordinance of 1914 had been promulgated to ensure that Nigeria
was brought in a way unmistakeable to anyone into the sphere of the
Common Law applicable in England inclusive of the Statutes of Gen-
eral Application which were in force in England as at 1900. The law
had provided: Subject to the terms or any other Ordinance, the Com-
mon law, the Doctrines of Equity and Statutes of General Application
which were in force in England on January 1, 1909, shall be in force
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Nigeria.5
This lawwas further reinforced in all material particular by the Pro-
tectorate Ordinance of 1933 which contained the same provision in its
section 12, as those of section 14 of the Supreme Court Ordinance cited
above. Under this kind of legal system, any law in Nigeria proving
inadequate for matters of criminal and civil litigations was supple-
mented by those of England regulating similar issues.
Since the 1900s therefore, issues of criminal justice and litigation
had fallen in Nigeria within the purview of English legal system or
1 S. ABUBAKAR, “The Norther Provinces Under Colonial Rule”, in: O. IKIME (ed.),
Groundwork of Nigerian History, Ibadan 1980, pp. 447–481.
2 T. TAMUNO, “British Colonial Administration in Nigeria”, in: O. IKIME (ed.),
Groundwork of Nigerian History, Ibadan 1980, pp. 393–409.
3 See T.O. ELIAS,Nigeria: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, London 1967, p.
24; A.O. OBILADE, The Nigerian Legal System, Ibadan 1979, p. 22.
4 Ibidem, p. 30; see also Nigeria Supreme Court Ordinance (No. 11) of 1863, Nigeria,
Protectorate Court Ordinance (No. 45), 1933.
5 Supreme Court Ordinance, 1914: section 14.
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British inspired legal codes. Specifically, the Criminal Code which was
enacted in 1916 as a principal law for the regulation of criminal mat-
ters was of British origin.6 This was the applicable law in Nigeria as
the time that Constable Thomas Shorunke was accused of stealing and
breaking into a shop with a view to committing felony therein. The
Criminal Code’s counterpart law for the enforcement of the substan-
tive law itself, the Criminal Procedure Ordinance was however not
enacted until 1923 and consolidated in the Criminal Procedure act of
1 June, 1945. However recourse was had to relevant English laws and
the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1914 or the Protectorate Court Or-
dinance of 1933 on the correct processes and procedures to follow in
criminal litigations whenever there was need for it. The Criminal Code
had outlawed the act of stealing when it provided thus: Any person
who steals anything capable of being stolen is guilty of a felony, and is
liable, if no other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for three
years.7
Again, the same law had provided on unlawful breaking thus: Any
person who breaks and enters a school house, or a building which
is adjacent to a dwelling house and occupied with but is not part of
it, and commits a felony therein; or having committed a felony in a
school house, shop or warehouse, store office or counting house, or in
any such other building as last mentioned, breaks out of the building,
is guilty of a felony, and is liable for imprisonment for fourteen years.8
The severity of the punishment attached to the above offences
leaves no one in doubt as to the seriousness of the legal battle which
confronted Constable Thomas Shorunke particularly as a police officer
who was expected to be at least, fairly above board in the display of
the best attitude towards the law and orderly or honest conduct in so-
cial affairs. He was committed to trial first at the High court, Ibadan, in
February, 1940, and was found guilty and subsequently sentenced to
seven years imprisonment. He appealed to the West African Court of
Appeal in April, 1940, which then sat in Sierra Leone and lost. Again,
in 1944 via the Appeal No. 88 of that year, he filed an appeal against
his conviction to the highest possible court in the British Common-
wealth, the Privy Council, and the court found for him on the grounds
6 See Nigeria, Criminal Code (CAP 77), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
7 Nigeria, Criminal Code, 1916: section 390.
8 Nigeria, Criminal Code, 1916: section 413(1) and (2).
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that the processes and procedures leading to his conviction at the trial
court were incurably flawed. That judgment established for Nigeria
and, the indeed, the British Commonwealth, a judicial precedent of an
especially momentous proportion on the trajectory of the due process
of law in criminal litigation.
Constable Shorunke’s gallant fight for the due process has become
a reference point in Nigeria’s judicial discourse today and is therefore
deserving of a proper historical reconstruction to serve as a lesson to
judicial and police officers in Nigeria. hence it is important to interro-
gate the matter by posing the pertinent questions: (i) what really could
be said to be the propelling force for a very junior police officer of Sho-
runke’s stature to take on the State (or the King) as at that time from
the very foundations of legal intermediation in Nigeria to the high-
est court in England in proving his innocence?; (ii) was Shorunke’s
acquittal based only on legal technicality rather than on the equally
important consideration of the justice of the matter?; (iii) since he had
served his full sentence at the time the Privy Council found for him
and quashed his conviction what necessary legal remedy was avail-
able to him to seek compensation for wrongful conviction and did he
pursue it? It is to these and some other pertinent issues that this paper
addresses itself.
History of the Case
In January 1940, a police Constable, together with three other police-
men and three civilians, all adult males, were arrested and accused
of committing the crime of breaking into a shop at Ogbomoso, enter-
ing into it without lawful authority and stealing therefrom, the sum of
£300 being property of another with a view to permanently depriving
its owner of the said sum. The location of the alleged crime, Ogbo-
moso, was a local community in the western part of Nigeria, which
was about 200 kilometres north of the capital of that part, Ibadan. Og-
bomoso in 1940 was by any descriptions a small town with a popu-
lation of between 10,000–14,000 inhabitants. Criminal activities over
there was not only significantly less than what was obtainable in a
relatively more populated neighbouring areas as Oyo, Ilorin or even
Osogbo, which were provincial headquarters of the Osun District in
the Western part of Nigeria but the culture of honesty and hard work,
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protection of family honour by ensuring good behaviour and reputa-
tion were hallowed values of the village.
Thomas Shorunke, the subject of our discourse was a Police Con-
stable; a native of Abeokuta, a Yoruba town noted for its very accom-
modating pro-British stance. Although the independence of Abeokuta
had been acknowledged and respected by the British colonial author-
ities, the town was nonetheless a sort of a British inspired modern
African community. Hence, schools which taught European-style edu-
cation, churches especially those patterned after those of England and
Exeter as well as British trained artisans and “westernised” elite were
integral features of Abeokuta as an emerging African modern city in
the first part of the 20th century.9
The crimes for which Thomas Shorunke was accused were, by the
rules of engagement of the Nigeria Police in the 1940s and the pub-
lic office which he occupied as a law officer, grave.10 The crime of
stealing was punishable under the then extant Criminal Code by im-
prisonment for a period not less than 3 years.11 The second offence
for which he was charged, illegal breaking into a property and com-
mitting felony thereon, to wit stealing, was also serious being an in-
dictable offence which carried the sentence, on conviction, of 14 years
imprisonment.12 It is important to note that the alleged crimes were
committed just a year after the beginning of the Second World War,
a time in which public servants in Nigeria were required to face and
bear the brunt of the frugality of British war economy during which
salaries were paid irregularly to all categories of public servants in
Nigeria. However, Thomas Shorunke was an adult with full capacity
to apprehend the import and consequences of his alleged action and
no evidence was led at his trial to show that he was not in full control
of his mental faculty.
The chronology of the case was like this: on 1 February, 1940, Sho-
runke and the other co-accused were formally charged at the High
9 L. DAVIES, “The Rise and Fall of Egba Independence: A Review”, in: Ife Journal of
History, 6, 1, 2013, pp. 1–24.
10 Thomas Shorunke v. The King (1946) Appeal Cases, in: The Law Reports of the Incorpo-
rated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales, published by Butterworth & Co.
1974, pp. 316–327.
11 Nigeria, Criminal Code 1916: section 390.
12 Nigeria, Criminal Code 1916: section 413.
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Court which sat in Ibadan to hear his case. This was after an initial in-
vestigation of the charges at the District Magistrate Court which sat in
the same town, Ibadan. Evidence was given in the case by the Prose-
cution and Shorunke together with six other accused persons reserved
his defence. Shorunke pleaded not guilty after which he told the court
he would be represented by a counsel, by the name Mr. Wells Palmer,
who was not in court on that day. Hence, the trial judge gave instruc-
tions that the saidMr Palmer be contacted by telegram to intimate him
of what the accused said and of the need for him to appear in court to
defend his supposed client. However, the judge also gave instructions
to the Police to ensure that the accused got every facility he needed
to get in touch with his counsel but that if this failed he should be as-
sisted to secure one locally. Thereafter, he adjourned the matter to the
following day.
It turned out that Mr. Palmer denied being the legal representative
of the accused and he informed the court he would not be appearing.
So, the trial proceeded on the 2nd of February against all the accused
persons. However during the sitting on 2nd February, Thomas Sho-
runke handed over to the court a list of witnesses and documents that
he wanted to call or tender in his own defence. But he did not give
the reasons why he wanted the witnesses called or inkling into the
testimony he would want them give in his favour. The learned judge
(John Asst. J), at the end of the day’s sitting warned Shorunke that he
must give an idea of the testimony he would have the witnesses give
in his defence and the contents of the documents contained in his list
submitted to the court so that the court could determine whether the
testimonies were relevant or not. The learned judge also told Shorunke
that if the testimonies were relevant hewould issue free subpoenas but
not otherwise.
The following day, 3rd February, the Solicitor-General who appeared
for the prosecution informed the court that he had tried to assist Sho-
runke arrange his witnesses and documents but that he refused him
cooperation; he pleaded that the court relieved him of further respon-
sibility to do this any further. At that point the learned judge rose
to reconsider his earlier directive to the Police to give every neces-
sary assistance to Shorunke by asking to see him in his chambers in
the interest of justice and fair hearing so as to discover what wit-
nesses he would have called and the documents he would require.
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But in the course of proceedings on the same day and while Shorunke
was cross-examining one of the prosecution witnesses, the Solicitor-
General objected to one of the questions he put to one of the witnesses
on the grounds that it was irrelevant and the objection was upheld by
the court. Thereafter, Shorunke informed the court that he would no
longer ask any further questions or tender any documents until he got
a lawyer to defend him. He insisted that a lawyer was being sent to de-
fend him. In the course of further proceedings in the matter he refused
to say a word but remained mute throughout. However at the close of
the day’s sittings the learned judge asked to see Shorunke in his pri-
vate office to again interview him as to the content of the documents
he would like to tender and the gist of the testimony that his witnesses
would be presenting in his defence and the reasons for presenting the
documents he wished to present.
The learned judge was probably not convinced that the witnesses
could give any material evidence especially that many of them were
being called from Ondo, another town in south-western Nigeria far
removed by more than 200 kilometres from the scene of the alleged
crime. Still, Shorunke insisted he was not going to give the reasons
why he wanted to call the witnesses or tender the documents he had
proposed to tender and, at any rate, he said he would not be present-
ing any new list of witnesses and documents and that the one he had
earlier presented to court on the 2nd of February would suffice. At that
point the leaned judge told Shorunke that he would no longer get any
further assistance in his case and that if he needed to call anywitnesses
he would have to make his own private arrangement thenceforth.
On the 5th of February when the case continued, Shorunke objected
to the leaned judge sitting on the matter any further especially on the
grounds of the interaction he had had with the judge some two days
earlier. But the learned judge disregarded this protestation on the ra-
tionale that it was an attempt either to intimidate the court or delay the
course of justice in the matter. Note that even as at that time, the ac-
cused had not yet had the opportunity of being defended by a lawyer.
On the 13th of February, the court found Shorunke and all the other ac-
cused except one guilty of the charges preferred against them and sen-
tenced them including Shorunke to 7 years imprisonment with hard
labour.
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After his conviction Shorunke obtained the services of a lawyer and
he filed an appeal against the judgement of the lower court at theWest
African Court of Appeal (WACA) before their Lordships: Kingdon C.
J (Nigeria), Petrides C. J (Gold Coast) and Paul C. J (Sierra Leone).
He prayed the Court to set aside the judgement of the lower court on
the grounds that his right to fair hearing had been imperilled by the
refusal of that court to issue subpoenas denying him opportunity of
defending himself. He claimed that his defence was an alibi. He there-
fore applied to the court to call him and his witnesses to give evidence.
The court adjudicated on the matter in just about two months and dis-
missed on the 27th day of April, 1940, the application as lacking in
merit. Accordingly, it affirmed the conviction of the accused by the
lower.
Not done with the push for the justice of his case, Shorunke ap-
pealed to the Privy Council in London to avail him the opportunity
of British Common Law rights on the issuance of subpoenas. The ap-
peal came in 1944 by leave of WACA and their Lordships: Lord Porter
(who later delivered the judgement in the case) together with Lord Du
Parc and Sir John Beaumont presided over the matter. Mr. Elliot Gorst
appeared for the appellant and Sir Patrick Hastings and F. Gahan for
the Crown. The stage was thus set for a titanic legal battle in Eng-
land which was destined to set a monumental precedent in the British
Commonwealth and indeed, Nigeria’s criminal jurisprudence on the
due process of law. On Thursday, April 11, 1946, two years after the
appeal was filed, Shorunke got the judgement he had so passionately
sought after since his first committal for trial in Ibadan in February
1940. Lord Porter, on behalf of his other brother justices who agreed to
his lead judgement wasted no time in upholding the rule of law and
the justice in Shorunke’s contention when he said with finality:
Having regard to the fact that in their Lordships’ opinion, process
ought to have issued at the request of the appellant without the impo-
sition of the condition that he should disclose his reason for wishing to
call the various witnesses set out in his list, they are unable to say that
a grave miscarriage of justice has not occurred. They will accordingly
humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be allowed.13
13 The Law Reports (England) (1946) Appeal Cases, p. 327. The Incorporated council
for Law Reporting for England and Wales 1946.
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Issues of Law, the Rule of Law and the Due Process
For Thomas Shorunke, the issues of law in his contention were these:
(i) denial of the right to fair hearing by the court as a result of its re-
fusal to issue subpoena for the summoning of his witnesses; (ii) breach
of the rule of the due process of procedural law under the common law
rule for the summoning of witnesses by which the person asking for it
needed not give reasons for requiring that the witnesses be summoned
and; (iii) breach of the essential principles of justice by the court in con-
victing him only on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. These
were the three grounds of appeal in Thomas Shorunke’s petition to
the Privy Council which raised the fundamental and only question:
did the learned judge act judicially and judiciously by refusing to is-
sue subpoenas summoning the appellant’s witnesses on the grounds
that he did not give reasons why the witnesses should be summoned
or the gist of the testimony they would give in his case during trial?
Put differently ought the judge to have issued subpoenas without im-
posing conditions?
Thomas Shorunke contended that the learned judge should not
have imposed any conditions on him before issuing subpoenas and
that by demanding that he gave the gist of the testimony that the wit-
nesses would likely give in his behalf so that he could judge whether
they were relevant or not amounted to a denial of justice and the due
process of the law. Shorunke’s argument was that after the initial in-
vestigation of the matter at the Magistrate court in Ibadan, and his
committal to trial at the High Court, the learned judge should have
been led to accept that he was covered by the common law right for
accused persons whereby subpoenas issued as of right without con-
ditions and not as he had done, apply the Nigerian law – Criminal
Procedure Ordinance which the judge claimed covered the field and
prescribed that the accused person gave the gist of the testimony and
the content of documents contained in the list of witnesses presented
to court before subpoenas could be issued. Shorunke’s position was
that by virtue of the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1914, the criminal
justice system in Nigeria had to follow the provisions of the common
law rule at least, in so far as the issue of subpoenas was concerned.14
The relevant section of the law had provided, inter alia: “the Common
14 See CAP 3, Laws of Nigeria, 1923.
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law, the Doctrines of Equity and Statutes of General Application which were
in force in England on January 1, 1909, shall be in force within the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court of Nigeria”.15 It was therefore his opinion and
contention before the Privy Council that even if the judge was to be
in doubt as to the adequacy of the Nigerian legislation on the issue of
subpoenas he could havemade resort to the Common law principle by
virtue of the above cited portion of the Supreme Court Ordinance and
that by failing to do so, his conviction was unjust, at variance with the
due process of law, malicious, and should be so declared by the Privy
Council.
The prosecution countered this argument brilliantly by asserting
that the situation and conditions of criminal proceedings applicable
under the English Common Law system which was prayed for by
Shorunke were different from what obtained under the Nigerian sys-
tem. It averred that whereas under the English system wherein the
common law developed, criminal laws had evolved from several tra-
ditions and judges-made laws over many centuries, many of which
were not originally contained in statutes but under the Nigerian crim-
inal justice system, subpoenas was governed not by judges-made laws
but by codified statutes. It further averred that the relevant statutes
for the issuing of subpoena ad testificandum was the Criminal Proce-
dure Ordinance especially sections 66 and 67 of the law and that these
sections of the law had stipulated that the accused person must fulfil
certain conditions before a subpoena could be issued to summon his
witnesses.16 For instance and as pointed out by the prosecution sec-
tion 66 of the law had provided: Immediately after the accused shall
so have had opportunity of making his answer to the charge, the court
shall ask him whether he desires to call witnesses, and the deposition
of such witnesses as the accused shall call and who shall appear on
his behalf shall then be taken in the like manner as in the case of the
witnesses for the prosecution.17
Furthermore, section 67 of the same Ordinance provided: If the ac-
cused person states he has witnesses to call but that they are not pres-
ent in the court “and the court is satisfied that the absence of the witnesses
is not due to any fault or neglect of the accused, and that there is a likelihood
15 Nigeria, Supreme Court Ordinance 1914: section 14.
16 Nigeria, Criminal Procedure Ordinance 1914: CAP C. 20 Laws of Nigeria, 1923.
17 Ibidem, section 66.
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that they could give material evidence on his behalf”, the court may ad-
journ the investigation and issue process or take other steps to compel
the attendance of such witnesses.18
Thus, to the prosecution, the judge was entitled and bound to do
what he did by simply applying the rules contained in the above pro-
visions of the law which required that certain conditions be fulfilled
by the accused, namely: (a) that it was not owing to the defendant (ac-
cused) that thewitnesses desired to be calledwere not present in court;
and (b) that if the witnesses were called they would be able to give ma-
terial evidence. In the Shorunke’s matter, the prosecution concluded
that the judge had to determine whether the application for subpoe-
nas was not been made malafide and that the only way the learned
judge could be satisfied that this was not the case was by the accused
person answering the simple question as to the purpose/reason for
which he wanted to call those witnesses or whether it was a case of
attempting to delay the course of trial or intimidate the court. And,
that even section 62 of the Supreme Court Ordinance which was also
repeated in pari material in section 12 of the then extant Protectorate
Court Ordinance of 1933 had ordained that certain conditions subject
to some exceptions be levied before subpoena can be issued.19 The law
provided: In any case or matter and at any stage thereof, the court ei-
ther of its own motion or on the application of any party summon any
person within the jurisdiction to attend to give evidence or to produce
any document within his possession and may examine such person as
witness and require him to produce any document in his possession
or power, subject to just exceptions.20
However, the Privy Council considered the position of the prose-
cution as set out above as mistaken. The law referred to, sections 66
and 67 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance of 1914 applied not to the
stage if trial of the accused person but to the “Preliminary Investiga-
tion” stage, not to “Summary Trial” as shown in Part II of the same law.
Hence, that part (i. e. part II) which required conditions before sub-
poenas could be issued did not cover the whole field of criminal trial.
Hence, the learned judge should have made recourse to the Supreme
18 Ibidem, section 67.
19 Nigeria, Protectorate Court Ordinance of 1933 (PCO 1933): section 12; SupremeCourt
Ordinance, 1914: section 62.
20 Nigeria, Supreme Court Ordinance, 1914: section 62.
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Court Ordinance of 1914 which would have availed him the opportu-
nity of applying the common law rule on the issuance of subpoenas;
his failure to do this in the opinion of the Privy Council irreparably
injured the due process of the law in that matter.
Again, it was the opinion of the Privy Council that although section
62 of the SupremeCourt Ordinance cited above had provided that “the
Court may” examine a person and require him to produce evidence,
the word “may” there should not be interpreted to mean that the right
of the accused person to secure a subpoena was not an imperative of
the law or that it was only subject to the discretion of the court; in fact,
based on the strict requirement of fair hearing of the due process of the
law it was actually mandatory. That section, according to the Council,
only gave an additional powers to the Court to issue process at any
stage either suo motu (by court’s own decision) or at the request of any
party to a dispute.
This reading of the Nigerian Ordinance had its backing in the per-
suasive laws of the State of Madras – section 149 of Act VIII (1859)
and section 159 of Act XIV (1882) and in the case, Veerabadran Chetty
v. Nataraja Desikar in which the court held that an accused was enti-
tled to obtain summons for the attendance of witnesses on application
before the day fixed for judgement and that the judge could not un-
der the sections referred to above refuse the application. In the case of
Veerabadran Chetty the court had held that: “It is not for him (i. e. the
Judge) to assume or infer that such witness is not likely to know anything
in the matter in dispute, or to be of any use to the party applying. That is a
matter for the applicant himself to consider.”21
In other words, the decision by the trial court to demand reasons
why Shorunke wanted to call the witnesses he had applied to be sub-
poenaed was not only wrong, the judge also erred in law by inferring
that those witnesses (even if they were to be summoned from Ondo or
elsewhere that was not geographically contiguous to the place of the
alleged crime (Ogbomoso) as the judge remarked in his judgment),
could not give any material evidence that could substantiate the de-
fence of the accused. The Council held that the learned judge ought
to have issued the subpoena requested without such conditions. This
21 See The Law Reports (TLR) (England) (1946) Appeal Cases, 318; also, Veerabadran
Chetty v. Nataraja Desikar (1904) T.L.R. 28, M., 28, 36.
320
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
K. Rotimi – A.O. Ogunyemi, Justice, Due Process and the Rule of Law in Nigeria
position was further buttressed by the decision of court in an earlier
case ofMuhammad Nawaz v. King Emperor in which the court held inter
alia that one of the grounds upon which an appellant might validly
apply for a review of his case was if the accused “was not allowed to
call relevant witnesses”.22 Hence in upholding Shorunke’s contention
that the due process of the law had not been followed in his trial and
that as a result he was denied fair trial and made to suffer unduly, the
Privy Council said: The right of an accused person who is in custody
to call witnesses and to the production of documents is vested in any
prisoner and he should only be deprived of it by circumstances which
render its reasonable enforcement impossible. It was the duty of the
trial court both under Or. V. r. 1, of the Protectorate court Ordinance,
1933, and also as a matter of essential justice to issue the summons
to witnesses to give evidence and to produce documents which the
appellant requested, and the court had no discretion in the circum-
stances to refuse the application. It was not for the court to assume or
infer that the witnesses asked for did not know anything material, and
the only ground on which a summons to any such witness could have
been lawfully refused was because it was evident that the witness was
not being summoned bona fide and that the summons would therefore
be an abuse of the process of the court. The appellant was uncondi-
tionally entitled to call such witnesses as he reasonable considered
would help him in his defence, and refusal of witnesses’ summons
made it impossible for him to put forward his defence to the charge
made against him after the refusal to issue the subpoena, the convic-
tion was unlawful and ought to be quashed. The refusal of the court
of Appeal to admit before them the evidence which the appellant de-
sired, or otherwise to cause such evidence to be considered amounted
in the circumstances to a denial of justice.23
No better decision as shown in the words of the court above, for the
sake of justice and the due process of law could be made. The Privy
Council recognised the need for justice and the due process of the law
in the Shorunke’s case and made for Nigeria, a locus classicus in the
annals of the country’s criminal justice systemwhich has remained till
22 Ibidem; also,Muhammad Nawaz v. King Emperor (1941) L.R. 68, i.A. 126, 128.
23 The Law Reports (England) (1946) Appeal Cases, 319.
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today a reference point in how to conduct fair hearing and grant to the
accused ample opportunity to defend himself.
Conclusions
The issue of justice, both legal and natural, transcends the mere ad-
herence to the dictates of substantive law. Observance of the proce-
dural law, which governs the process by which substantive laws are
enforced, is very critical to reaching a just decision on any matter in
litigation. Their Lordships have shown that in the case of Thomas Sho-
runke neglecting to follow the due process of law in reaching a deci-
sion can be fatal to the decision itself and would, if need be, be set
aside by a higher court. In other words, while the truth of a matter is
the object sought after by substantive laws, the justice of the process is
the concern of procedural laws which was well proved in the dictates
of the Supreme Court Ordinance of 1914. Note that the Privy Coun-
cil did not rule that Thomas Shorunke did not break into and steal
from a shop in Ogbomoso in 1940, it might well have been that after
the due process of trying him had been followed that he might have
been validly convicted on those charges, but that the process begun
in Ibadan at the High Court to prove his guilt failed the litmus test of
fair hearing, the due process of the law and the requirements of legal
justice because the accused was denied the opportunity of calling his
witnesses by the failure of the learned judge to issue subpoenas with-
out imposing any conditions on the accused. Hence, what Shorunke
got was legal justice on the manner he was convicted and not whether
he broke into and committed felony in a shop or not. The lesson of
history here is that a decision might be legally “correct” and still not
be legally “just”. And, since the purpose of the adjudicatory system
in the commonwealth as at that time was to reach a “just” decision
and not necessarily a “correct” decision, it can be validly claimed that
the position taken and the decision reached by the Privy Council in
1946 on the Shorunke’s case accorded well with the principles of legal
justice and the due process of the law in every material particular.
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